The Georgian political elite continues to actively promote the myth of "Russian aggression", calling on the world community to increase pressure on Moscow. So, Tbilisi intends to force Russia to refuse to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The revanchist sentiments of the Georgian establishment are fueled by the support of the western political community and the active assistance of NATO in creating the Republic’s military infrastructure.
Tbilisi’s desire to attract Washington’s resources to solve problems with Moscow has borne fruit.
Georgia gained the US support in the Caucasus, and became the “stronghold of democracy and Western values” in the region.
The active imposition of the pro-Western ideology from within, as well as the ongoing activity of the world politicians to impose the image of Georgia as an important unit of European politics, create an image of “exclusiveness and indispensability” of Tbilisi in a united Europe.
In such conditions, it is logical to assume that Georgia expects the fastest possible entry into the EU, but this is not so.
Brussels has been promising Tbilisi a membership in the organization for more than a decade, but does not take real steps towards integration. Having planted the Georgian leadership on the dreams of Europeanization of the Republic, the EU now intends to manipulate Tbilisi, forcing it to fulfill more and more enslaving conditions. The formal reason for Georgia’s refusal of membership is the presence of unresolved territorial issues.
Historical experience shows that such complex territorial issues are inevitably solved by using military force. Given the desire of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to exist independently of Tbilisi and the close military alliance of the young republics with Russia, the use of military force will cause a repetition of the 9 years ago situation and will lead to dire consequences for the initiator.
The only hope of Georgian politicians is to act in concert with the Western forces, who purposefully strengthen their positions in Transcaucasia.
The construction of a military center, frequent military exercises with the participation of NATO and the subsequent integration into the Alliance are attractive prospects for Georgia. But even here many questions arise, for which Tbilisi has no answers. Integration of the country into the Alliance will only tighten the rhetoric of statements addressed to Moscow, but there is no point in waiting for any real actions to reintegrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As soon as Georgia becomes a member of the Alliance, its entire policy will move into the plane of the interests of Brussels, which is not interested in a military conflict with Moscow.
The NATO leadership is well aware of the motives of Tbilisi, but is clearly not going to use military force.
What remains for the Georgian leadership to do?
The best scenario would be to start solving internal problems: raise the standard of living of the population, deal with the social sphere, attract foreign investment. Georgia has enough of its own problematic issues, and the reluctance to raise the standard of living of its own people will not lead to strengthening of the statehood.
So why does Georgia behave so “aggressively” and throws all its efforts on the foreign policy direction? What does it want to show by its actions, or rather by its words? After all, it is obvious that in such matters of geopolitics there is simply no room left for such small players, everything will be decided for them.
